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I. INTRODUCTION
*City police departments discovered to have abused the cover of
immunity to avoid prosecution for major traffic violations,
leaving citizens to cover accident damages caused by at-fault
police officers.'
* Minorities driving through mostly white suburbs found twice as
likely to be ticketed for traffic violations as whites.
* Drunken snowmobile driver kills child in an accident, yet the
snowmobiler's license and licenses of more than 2,000 other
snowmobile owners had been suspended for alcohol-related
offenses.3
All of these public safety news stories were constructed with the use
of motor vehicle records.4 And all of these stories-and stories like them-
may never again be possible in the wake of the federal Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA).5
The DPPA, instituted in 1997, regulates the disclosure of personal
information in motor vehicle records. New controversy surrounds it today
as the U.S. Supreme Court evaluates the arguments presented in November
61999 regarding its constitutionality. Decisions in the Fourth, Seventh,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit courts over the past year have disputed the
DPPA's validity under the Tenth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, and First
Amendments. A split among these courts, coupled with the tremendous
growth in technology and subsequent new in-roads for information access,
have drawn increased attention towards the DPPA.
The concern for information access in light of the DPPA, however,
reaches beyond the courts' elucidated concerns about dual sovereignty and
the public's right to privacy. This Note argues that there is a forgotten
argument-or at least brushed to the side. Only one of the courts-the
Seventh Circuit-actually examined the DPPA's effect on the First
Amendment. This issue should not only be considered as a serious factor,
but scrutinized carefully within the discussion surrounding the DPPA's





5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
6. As of the publication date of this Note, the Supreme Court was docketed to hear the
oral arguments for Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Reno v.
Condon, 67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464), involving the DPPA, on
November 10, 1999. On the Docket-Northwestern University (visited Oct. 31, 1999)
<http://www.medill.nwu.edu/docket/cases.srch>.
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constitutionality, especially since the Act's ramifications now have spread
into virtually every comer of the news-gathering process.
This Note does not delve with extensive detail into the legal
arguments behind dual sovereignty or right to privacy, but rather utilizes
these issues generally in order to properly frame a comprehensive
discussion about the constitutionality of the DPPA in light of the First
Amendment and information access. In addition, rather than focus on the
rights of private individuals, this Note centers on the insidious effects of
the DPPA on the ability of the news media and commercial institutions to
access motor vehicle records.
Part II of this Note provides an overarching examination of the DPPA
as a statute and as a policy, presenting a detailed look at the legislative
history and congressional intent behind the Act as well as its consequent
statutory construction. Part Ill examines the states' options under the
DPPA and the difficulty they faced in implementing the Act while
simultaneously striving to preserve notions of state sovereignty and
information access. Part IV presents the recent decisions of the four circuits
currently split over the DPPA's constitutionality, summarizing the
arguments presented within Tenth, Fourteenth, Eleventh, and First
Amendment contexts. Part V reviews these decisions and the DPPA's
ramifications from a First Amendment standpoint and argues in favor of
finding the Act unconstitutional for several enumerated reasons. This Note
concludes by noting that although the Act may have been well-intended
and even necessary on an individual state-by-state bases, the federal DPPA
ultimately not only infringes on the First Amendment, but unduly inhibits
the news-gathering process and severely restricts the right of information
access.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE DRIVER'S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
A. Historical and Legislative Background
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-California) introduced the DPPA into the
U.S. Senate on November 16, 1993, 7 as an amendment to the Violent
Crime Control Act of 1994.g The proposed DPPA was developed "to
7. See 139 CONG. REc. S 15,761-66 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
8. See W. Kent Davis, Drivers' Licenses: Comply with the Provisions of the Federal
Driver's Privacy Protection Act; Provide Strict Guidelines for the Release of Personal
Information from Drivers' Licenses and Other Records of the Department of Public Safety,
14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 196, 197 (1997) (citing Jane Kirtley, The EU Data Protection
Directive and the First Amendment: Why a "Press Exemption" Won't Work, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 639, 641 (1995)).
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protect the personal privacy and safety of licensed drivers consistent with
the legitimate needs of business and government."9 The impetus behind the
Act was the 1989 death of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the hit
television series, My Sister Sam. I0 A stalker murdered Schaeffer in the
doorway of her California apartment after obtaining her home address
through a Tucson detective agency that had procured the information from
state motor vehicle records."
Although Senator Boxer and additional supporters argued that the
DPPA served as a necessary and well-written act intending to strike "a
critical balance between the legitimate governmental and business needs
for this information, and the fundamental right of our people to privacy and
,,12safety, not everyone stood in agreement that a federal DPPA was the
right means to meet those ends. In fact, although Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah) agreed that more measures should be taken to combat stalking and to
prevent general disclosure of personal information by government
agencies, he highlighted three distinct and legitimate concerns about
instituting a federal DPPA. 3 First, Senator Hatch raised the practical issue
that there had not been an adequate amount of time since the introduction
of the crime bill to address the DPPA's potential impact and cost.' 4 Second,
he reminded the Senate that the Act would place "unfunded mandates"' 5 on
the states which could result in the states prohibiting all uses of motor
vehicle records, even for "legitimate business and press purposes. ' 
6
Finally, Senator Hatch voiced a constitutional concern about subjecting
states' departments of motor vehicles to civil penalties for "wrongful
disclosure of drivers license information" under the Act.
7
Before relinquishing the floor of the Senate during the debate,
Senator Hatch raised what he saw as one of the greatest potential harms of
the DPPA: severely restricting access to information and thus, greatly
9. 139 CONG. REC. S15,761 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
10. See id. at S 15,762.
11. See id.; 138 CONG. REc. H1785 (1992) (statement of Rep. Moran); see also William
J. Watkins, Jr., The Driver's Privacy Protection Act: Congress Makes a Wrong Turn, 49
S.C. L. REv. 983, 984 (1998).
12. 139 CONG. REc. S 15,763 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
13. See id. at S15,763 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
14. See id. (statement of Sen. Hatch) (according to Senator Hatch, the crime bill had
been introduced less than one month prior to the discussion of the DPPA as an amendment).
15. The term "unfunded mandates" refers to the fact that although the federal DPPA
would mandate or force the states to institute the Act, it would not provide the states with
any federal funding to help defray implementation costs. See id.
16. 139 CONG. REc. S15,763 (1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
17. Id.
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inhibiting the news-gathering process. I Reading aloud a letter from the
Utah branch of the Society of Professional Journalists, Senator Hatch
elucidated the concerns of the press and stated that consideration needed to
be given to "these professional journalists and others who feel [Senator
Boxer's] amendment might be damaging to the information-gathering
process." 19 Despite Senator Hatch's objections, both the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives" passed the amendment, and President Bill
Clinton signed it into law on September 13, 1994,21 thus creating the
federal DPPA currently in place.
B. Statutory Construction and Application
The DPPA contains five main sections. The first part of the statute,
section 2721, sets out the general prohibition of the release and use of
22particular personal information obtained from state motor vehicle records.
Specifically, section 2721(a) of the DPPA states that "a State department of
motor vehicles [DMV] ... shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make
available to any person or entity personal information about any individual
obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record."
' 1
Section 2725(3) further defines "personal information" as "an individual's
photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name,
address, telephone number, and medical or disability information.2 4
However, an individual's five-digit zip code, as well as information on
vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver's status, are not included
in this prohibitionary measure.25 Additionally, section 2721(b) also lists the
fourteen exceptions to the DPPA, ranging from agencies carrying out
official functions to insurance companies verifying information provided
26by potential clients. The "permissible uses" appear as follows:
(1) For use by any government agency, including any court or law
enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions, or any private
person or entity acting on behalf of a [fiederal, [s]tate, or local agency
in carrying out its functions.
(2) For use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver
safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See 138 CONG. REc. H1785 (1992) (statement of Rep. Moran). House
Representative James P. Moran (D-Va.) was the House sponsor for the DPPA. See id.
21. See Davis, supra note 8, at 197.
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
23. Id. § 2721(a).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (1994).
25. See id.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1)-(14); see also Watkins, supra note 11, at 985.
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alterations, recalls, or advisories; performance monitoring of motor
vehicles, motor vehicle parts and dealers; motor vehicle market
research activities, including survey research; and removal of non-
owner [sic] records from the original owner records of motor vehicle
manufacturers.
(3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business
or its agents, employees, or contractors, but only-
(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by
the individual to the business or its agents, employees, or
contractors; and
(B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no
longer correct, to obtain the correct information, but only for the
purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal remedies against,
or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual.
(4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative or
arbitral proceeding in any [flederal, [s]tate or local court or agency or
before any self-regulatory body, including the service of process,
investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or
enforcement of judgments and orders, or pursuant to an order of a
[f]ederal, [s]tate, or local court.
(5) For use in research activities, and for use in producing statistical
reports, so long as the personal information is not published,
redisclosed, or used to contact individuals.
(6) For use by any insurer or insurance support organization, or by a
self-insured entity, or its agents, employees, or contractors, in
connection with claims investigation activities, antifraud activities,
rating[,] or underwriting.
(7) For use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded
vehicles.
(8) For use by any licensed private investigative agency or licensed
security service for any purpose permitted under this subsection.
(9) For use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain or verify
information relating to a holder of a commercial driver's license that is
required under the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (49
U.S.C. App. 2710 et seq.).
(10) For use in connection with the operation of private toll
transportation facilities.
(11) For any other use in response to requests for individual motor
vehicle records if the motor vehicle department has provided in a clear
and conspicuous manner on forms for issuance or renewal of operator's
permits, titles, registrations, or identification cards, notice that personal
information collected by the department may be disclosed to any
business or person, and has provided in a clear and conspicuous
manner on such forms an opportunity to prohibit such disclosures.
(12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the
motor vehicle department has implemented methods and procedures to
ensure that-
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(A) individuals are provided an opportunity, in a clear and
conspicuous manner, to prohibit such uses; and
(B) the information will be used, rented, or sold solely for bulk
distribution for surveys, marketing, and solicitations, and that
surveys, marketing, and solicitations will not be directed at those
individuals who have requested in a timely fashion that they not
be directed at them.
(13) For use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates it has
obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information
pertains.
(14) For any other use specifically authorized under the law of the
State that holds the record, if such use is related to the operation of a
motor vehicle or public safety.
2 7
The "opt-out" choice constitutes one final and crucial provision of
section 2721. Under sections 2721(b)(11) and (12) of the federal DPPA,
state motor vehicle departments may establish what has commonly been
referred to as "opt-out provisions" upon adoption of the federal Act. These
provisions allow a state to release personal information to any individual or
business as long as the state provides drivers written notice that includes, in
a "clear and conspicuous manner[,] ... an opportunity to prohibit such
disclosures."2 This provision includes requests for personal information for
bulk distribution of surveys, marketing, or solicitations.2 ' The use of
individual state opt-out provisions as responses to the DPPA will be
examined and discussed in further detail in Part El of this Note.
Section 2722 prohibits unlawful acts, including procurement of motor
vehicle records for unlawful purposes (purposes not permitted under
section 2721(b)) and false representation for purposes of obtaining
information from an individual's motor vehicle records20 Any individual
who commits the acts enumerated in section 2722 or knowingly violates
any part of the DPPA faces criminal fines in accordance with section 2723,
which also provides for the controversial five thousand dollars-a-day civil
penalty against states that have "a policy or practice of substantial
noncompliance" with the DPPA .
The fourth part, section 2724(a), also raises serious debate, as it
authorizes causes of action and subsequent remedies against any person
who "knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a
motor vehicle record," for a purpose that violates the DPPA. 2 This Note, in
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(l)-(14).
28. Id. § 2721(b)(11).
29. See id. § 2721(b)(12)(A).
30. See id. § 2722(a)-(b) (1994).
31. Id. § 2723(a)-(b) (1994).
32. Id. § 2724(a)-(b) (1994).
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Part IV, discusses how section 2724(a) is unclear and generates much
controversy as to whether it actually allows claims against states and state
employees acting in their official capacities. The fifth and final part of the
Act, section 2725, clarifies three crucial terms used in the Act itself by
providing clear definitions. The section defines a "motor vehicle record" as
"any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator's permit, motor
vehicle title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a
[DMV]. ' The term "person" includes "an individual, organization, or
entity, but does not include a State or agency thereof. 34 The section also
states that "personal information" encompasses "information that identifies
an individual, including an individual's photograph, social security
number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the five-digit
zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information, but
does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and
driver's status."35 When taken in sum, these five sections-sections 2721
through 2725-establish the statutory provisions and requirements that the
fifty states were required to adopt and abide by when the federal DPPA
became effective law in 1997."
III. STATE RESPONSE
Although the DPPA was enacted in 1994, states had until September
13, 1997, to implement the Act.37 The states' legislative responses to the
federal law varied considerably, as the resulting state statutes differed on
several particular provisions. Those state laws included statutes that
mirrored the federal law, proved more restrictive than the federal law,
included opt-out or opt-in provisions, or created media exemptions. Of the
eleven states that enacted state statutes that mirrored the federal law, only
Arkansas tightened restrictions on driver (as opposed to vehicle) records.39
33. Id. § 2725(1) (1994).
34. Id. § 2725(2) (1994).
35. Id. § 2725(3) (1994).
36. See id. § 2721 (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
37. See id.
38. Where the States Stand, QUILL, Sept. 1997, at 24, available at SPJ: FOI Resource
Drivers Records (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://spj.org/foia/drivers/drivsidel.html>. For an
excellent and fairly up-to-date contact list for all the states' department of motor vehicles
(complete with addresses and phone numbers), see the Federal Trade Commission's Internet
site, Department of Motor Vehicle Addresses (visited Aug. 26, 1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/dmv-add.htm#Michigan>.
39. See Where the States Stand, supra note 38, at 24. The states implementing statutes
mirroring the federal law include the following: Alabama, Arkansas (vehicle records),
Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Vermont.
See id.
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Arkansas' driver records, along with the records of seven other states, have
been controlled by surprisingly more restrictive state laws that predate the
DPPA.
40
The majority of the states, however, chose to establish a certain form
of legal exemption through opt-out laws or policies.4' These opt-out laws
give individual drivers or vehicle owners the option to choose the level of
confidentiality for personal information by keeping some, but not all,
42
motor vehicle records open. For example, Minnesota gives its driversthree options on their opt-out forms: 1) choose not to allow individual
40. See id. The states that implemented state laws already more restrictive than the
federal DPPA include the following: Alaska (driver records), Arkansas (driver records),
California, Georgia, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia. See id. Massachusetts chose
to mirror federal law as well, but only after considering an opt-out provision. See id.;
Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles, Driver Privacy Protection Act (visited Oct. 31,
1999) <http:llwww.state.ma.us/rmv/privacy/index.htm>. New Jersey followed suit after
deciding against a media exemption. See Where the States Stand, supra note 38, at 24; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:2-3.4 (West 1997). Although Alabama considered both an opt-out policy
and a media exemption, the state quickly filed suit against the federal government on the
grounds that the DPPA conflicted with Alabama's disclosure laws, especially Alabama
Code sections 32-6-14 and 26-12-40 (Alabama's "Open Records Act"). See ALA. CODE §§
32-6-14, 36-1240 (1975); Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (M.D. Ala. 1998); rev'd,
171 F.3d 1281 (1lth Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No.
99-61).
41. See id. The states that established opt-out laws or policies include the following:
Alaska (vehicle), Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah (vehicle), West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. The
motor vehicle departments in Indiana and New Mexico, however, chose not to implement
the opt-out provisions because of the high costs. See id. Maine also instituted a general out-
out policy. See Maine Secretary of State, Maine's Driver Privacy Brochure (visited Feb. 28,
1999) <http:lwww.state.me.us/sos/bmv/privacy.htm>. Louisiana and Michigan adopted
opt-out policies specifically regarding surveys, marketing, and solicitations. See Louisiana
Department of Public Safety Office of Motor Vehicles, Letters of Clearance (visited Oct.
28, 1999) <http:/www.dps.state.la.us/OMV1.nsf/lb2fc6edb63de9b1862564800069f248/
6b1827af0c10a7a78625661a00490110?OpenDocument>; Michigan Secretary of State, List
Sales Opt-Out Declaration (visited Feb. 28, 1999) <http:lwww.sos.state.mi.us/ bdvr/opt-
out.htm>. Massachusetts considered instituting an opt-out policy, but apparently decided
against it. See Where the States Stand, supra note 38, at 24; Massachusetts Registry of
Motor Vehicles, supra note 40. In addition to opt-out laws, some privacy advocates
encouraged a rather converse option, an opt-in provision, which instead operated on the
presumption of total privacy. Under these laws, individuals would theoretically give
permission to let his or her name be given out. See Joshua V. Sessler, Computer Cookie
Control: Transaction Generated Information and Privacy Regulation on the Internet, 5 J.L.
& POL'Y 627, 654-55 (1997). Opt-in options were successfully opposed by information
media and direct marketing companies, however, that understandably feared that a similar
fate would lay in wait for other public databases such as voter registration and real estate
records. See id.
42. See Schumacher, supra note 1, at 23.
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inquiries to be made on records; 2) choose not to let personal information
be given out for solicitation purposes; and 3) choose both options 1 and 2 .
Despite the fact that opt-out provisions appeared as attractive alternatives
to the restrictive federal DPPA, some states were reluctant to move ahead
and create the opt-out forms for fear of liability, federal penalties, and the
cost of administering new record-keeping systems.
44
Implementation of media exemptions served as the last-chance
remedial measure available to keep at least some of the records open for
those states that feared the potential repercussions from opting out and
even for some states that enacted opt-out laws or policies. These
exemptions, which fall under a provision of the federal DPPA,45 allow
media organizations access to records for reasons dealing with vehicle and
driver safety.46 Only a handful of states utilized these exemptions-many
of which had state press associations that had pushed for the special
provisions-since a majority of the national media organizations
surprisingly had fought against the exemptions.47
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON CONSTITUTIONALITY
Since the DPPA's enactment in 1994, four federal appellate courts
have grappled with the issue of the Act's constitutionality.4s The Tenth and
Seventh Circuits found the Act constitutional. 49 However, in September
1998, the Fourth Circuit-the first circuit court in the country to actually
issue a decision on the constitutionality of the DPPA-deemed the Act
unconstitutional as a violation of both the Tenth and Fourteenth
43. See Kyle E. Niederpruem, FOI Alert Volume 2 Issue 12, In Other States (visited
Aug. 26, 1999) <http://spj.org/foialalerts/alertsv2/issuel3.html>.
44. See Kyle E. Niederpruem, Driver Act Now State Fight (visited Aug. 26, 1999)
<http://spj.org/foia/drivers/drivmain2.html>.
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
46. See Schumacher, supra note 1, at 23.
47. See Where the States Stand, supra note 38, at 24. The states that chose to institute
media exemptions were the following: Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, and Oregon. See id. New Jersey considered establishing a
media exemption, but appears to have chosen against it. See id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:2-3.4
(West 1997). Alabama, Louisiana, and Michigan also considered media exemptions, but as
of the publication date of this Note, the Author found no evidence that any of these states
actually implemented such an exemption.
48. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No. 99-61); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, Reno v. Condon, 67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-
1464); Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th
Cir. 1998); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818).
49. See Oklahoma, 161 F.3d 1272-73; Travis, 163 F.3d at 1006-07.
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Amendments. Only seven months later in April 1999, the Eleventh
Circuit followed similar suit, finding that the DPPA violates the Tenth
Amendment.5
Quickly dispensing with the question of Congress's use of its
Commerce Clause power in construction of the DPPA,52 each court then
focused on the DPPA's constitutionality under at least one or more of four
specific amendments: Tenth, Fourteenth, Eleventh, and First
Amendments. 3 The courts' analyses varied in detail and content. Although
each of the four courts adequately addressed the concept of dual
sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment, only one court thoroughly
examined the merits of the DPPA under the First Amendment-the
Seventh Circuit.
A. Tenth Amendment
The courts relied on two main legal principles: 1) the system of dual
sovereignty set out by the language of the Tenth Amendment; and 2) two
separate lines of Supreme Court decisions that attempt to resolve the
historically troublesome issues of federalism and state sovereignty to
analyze the DPPA's constitutionality under the Tenth Amendment.
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution states: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the [s]tates, are reserved to the [s]tates respectively, or to the people." 4 As
conceded by all the courts in question, this Amendment establishes the
system duly recognized as "dual sovereignty" under the Constitution.5
However, the circuit courts faced great difficulty in determining the proper
division of sovereignty between the federal and state powers. This same
line-drawing debate demarcates the two lines of recent Supreme Court
cases that the circuit courts essentially relied upon and differentiated in the
quest to determine whether proper authority had been conferred to
50. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460-62,465.
51. See Pryor, 171 F.3d at 1288.
52. Although the Eleventh Circuit would eventually proceed under the assumption that
the DPPA had been enacted properly under Congress's Commerce power, the court initially
pointed out that this question was, in reality, a "troublesome issue." See id. at 1284. The
court continued to state that in "trying to protect legitimate governmental and business uses
of such information Congress riddled the Act with more holes than Swiss cheese. Through
these holes escaped most of the interstate commerce activity covered by the Act." Id. The
court chose not to further address this issue, however, as it had already deemed the Act
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 1284-85.
53. See id. at 1285; see also Condon, 155 F.3d 453; Oklahoma, 161 F.3d 1266; Travis,
163 F.3d 1000.
54. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
55. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458; Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1269.
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Congress to enact the federal DPPA.56
The first line of cases examined by the circuit courts included
Maryland v. Wirtz57 in 1968 and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority in 1985. The courts used the cases to delineate
Congress's authority to regulate the states as states, essentially holding that
"Congress may enact laws of general applicability that incidentally apply
to state governments." 9 The courts in both the Tenth and Seventh Circuits
relied on this legal framework and focused on a more recent Supreme
Court case, South Carolina v. Baker,6° which the government parties
suggested never posed a bar to federal legislation that regulated state
activity directly.6' Baker involved the constitutionality of section 310(b)(1)
of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), a
statute similar in structure to the DPPA.62 TEFRA removed interest earned
on bearer bonds issued by state and local governments from federal income• 63
tax exemptions. The Court did not invalidate the law under the Tenth
Amendment despite the fact that the law allegedly "commandeered the
state legislative and administrative process. ' 64 Criticizing the Fourth
Circuit's decision that held the DPPA unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit
argued that the DPPA did not conscript state officials in order to enforce
federal law. The Tenth Circuit instead claimed that like the TEFRA
provision in Baker, the DPPA operated as a federal regulation of state
activity and therefore "'a commonplace that presents no constitutional
defect."' 6' The Seventh Circuit backed up the Tenth Circuit's decision just
two weeks later, stating that "commandeering" occurred as an "'inevitable
consequence of regulating a state activity,"' rationalizing that merely
because a burden had been imposed on interstate commerce did not mean
66that the DPPA was unconstitutional . The court further reasoned that the
56. See generally Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
57. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
58. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
59. Condon, 155 F.3d at 458.
60. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
61. See Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266,
1270 (10th Cir. 1998).
62. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 515.
63. See id. at 514.
64. Id. at 514-15.
65. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272 (quoting Baker, 485 at 515).
66. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at
514-15).
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burden imposed by one law and offset by another should come to a bottom
line of substantially equal burdens. 67 Both courts, however, arrived at the
same conclusion that in light of Baker and the fact that the DPPA did not
bear down unequally on the states, the DPPA appeared to be a valid
exercise of Congress's power under the Tenth Amendment.
In the Fourth Circuit, however, Judge Williams pointed out the
danger of relying on case law that involved frequent decision turnovers and
pervasive problems with clarity, like the first line of cases. He therefore
discredited this entire line of cases as unreliable for evaluating the DPPA.
He stated in Condon that "[t]he Supreme Court's jurisprudence with
respect to the first line of cases has not been a model of consistency.
6 1
Judge Williams instead discovered his "model of consistency" in a second,
more recent group of cases. 69 Led by New York v. United States0 and Printz
v. United States,7 ' this second line of cases established Congress's authority
72
to direct states to implement or administer federal regulatory schemes.
This authority is limited only by the fact that Congress may not enact any
law that may direct the functioning of the states' executive or legislative73
processes. The Fourth Circuit adopted this rationale and concluded that
since the district court had found that state officials must administer the
DPPA,74 the regulation hence operates in clear violation of the above
Supreme Court law.75 Alternatively, under the first line of cases, the Fourth
Circuit deemed the DPPA unconstitutional, because "a law is not generally
applicable simply because it could be generally applicable .... Congress
may invade the sovereignty of the [s]tates only when it actually enacts a
67. See id. at 1006 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997)).
68. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Reno v. Condon,
119 S. Ct. (1999).
69. See id. at 459 ("In contrast, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to the
second line of cases has been a model of consistency.").
70. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress could not "commandeer" the
"legislative processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program"). This case involved a federal statute that included a provision
requiring individual states to either enact legislation regulating low-level radioactive waste
generated within the state's borders or take title to the waste. See id. at 176.
71. 521 U.S. 98 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot circumvent the prohibition of
compelling states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program, as stated in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), by directly conscripting a state's officers). Printz
involved the well-known "Brady Bill," which regulated the sale of handguns and included a
provision requiring state law enforcement officers to participate, even if only temporarily, in
the administration of the federally enacted regulatory scheme. See id.
72. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458.
73. See id.
74. See Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 985-86 (D.S.C. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 453
(1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
75. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
law of general applicability. Nothing short of that will pass constitutional
muster.,
76
Just seven months later, the Eleventh Circuit reinforced the Fourth
Circuit's ruling when it held the DPPA unconstitutional for violating the
Tenth Amendment." The Eleventh Circuit followed a similar rationale and
adhered to the second, more recent line of cases led by New York and
Printz. The court reasoned that unlike the laws at issue in Garcia and
Baker, "[i]nstead of bringing the [s]tates within the scope of an otherwise
generally applicable law, Congress passed the DPPA specifically to
regulate the [s]tates' control of the [s]tates' own property-the motor
vehicle records. 78 In addition, the court stated that the "principle of state
sovereignty" protected not just state power, but "a fundamental attribute"
of [s]tate sovereignty: "democratic accountability. '79 This concept of
democratic accountability, according to the court, formed the foundation
on which the U.S. Supreme Court rested its holdings in New York and
Printz.80 Therefore, because the DPPA did not operate as a law of general
applicability and diminished democratic accountability, the court found the
DPPA unconstitutional for violation of the Tenth Amendment."
Based upon these rationales, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
determined that Congress had no authority to enact the DPPA under the
United States' system of dual sovereignty.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
The Tenth Circuit, in Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Department of
82Public Safety v. United States, reasoned that since the DPPA had been
found valid in the face of the Tenth Amendment, it consequently did not
have to address the United States' additional argument that the DPPA was
also constitutional under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment." The
Seventh Circuit, in its own words, "ducked" the issue altogether in Travis
v. Reno, mentioning the question only to push the topic to a "future suit."
' 4
The Eleventh Circuit, relegating the Fourteenth Amendment evaluation to
the final footnote in its decision, determined that since the information in
76. Id. at 462 (second emphasis added).
77. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No. 99-61).
78. Id. at 1287.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1288.
82. 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
83. See id. at 1273, n.6.
84. Travis, 163 F.3d 1000, 1007.
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motor vehicle records did not constitute, in the court's view, "intimate
personal information given to a state official in confidence," it was not
"confidential information." 5 Therefore, the court explained that no
constitutional right to privacy existed for motor vehicle records because an
individual did not have a "reasonable expectation that the information is
confidential. 86 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the DPPA
overstepped Congress's exercise of power under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.87
The Fourth Circuit, the only court to proceed through a full analysis,
concluded in Condon that the DPPA had been enacted in violation of
Congress's powers as enumerated under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Amendment states, in pertinent part:
No [s]tate shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws .... The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
88
Relying on the recent Supreme Court case, City of Boerne v. Flores," the
Fourth Circuit emphasized that Congress's power to enact legislation under
the Fourteenth Amendment is not unlimited and "'does not override all
principles of federalism." 0 Instead, Congress's power only extends to
"'enforc[ing] the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 9' According
to the Fourth Circuit, this required the DPPA's constitutionality under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to turn on whether the Act
enforced some right guaranteed under the amendment. 92 The court then
proceeded to evaluate the only right the government contended that the
DPPA enforced under the Fourteenth Amendment: the right to privacy.
At the outset, the Fourth Circuit noted that "there is 'no general
constitutional right to privacy, '" '9 rather, only limited rights of privacy as
85. Pryor, 171 F.3d at 1288 n.10.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
89. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was a
"considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives," and also that
in enacting the statute, Congress had exceeded its power as given under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
90. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 464 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Reno v. Condon,
119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,469 (1991)).
91. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (emphasis added)).
92. See id.
93. Condon, 155 F.3d at 464 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 608 (1977)).
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to issues of reproduction, contraception, abortion,96 and marriage. 97 In
addition, and "[o]f particular importance here, neither the Supreme Court
nor this [c]ourt has ever found a constitutional right to privacy with respect
to the type of information found in motor vehicle records." 98 The court then
provided four reasons why motor vehicle record information could not be
considered private information. First, the court stated that drivers did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy toward this sort of information."
Second, the court highlighted that since the same type of information was
available from a number of other sources, like public property tax records,
the information could not be considered confidential.'0° Third, the court
outlined the long history supporting the treatment of motor vehicle records
as public records, citing a previous Fourth Circuit case where the court
held that an individual's name and home address are "'a matter of public
record in motor vehicle registration and licensing records."""' Finally, the
court reasoned that private parties often received the same information in
order to cash checks, use credit cards, board planes, or purchase alcohol,
and that the court seriously doubted that "an individual has a constitutional
right to privacy in information routinely shared with strangers."'102
Therefore, the court held that Congress violated section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment by enacting the DPPA, because no constitutional
right to privacy existed for motor vehicle record information. '03
C. Eleventh Amendment
Although the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits never examined
the DPPA under the Eleventh Amendment, the state of Wisconsin and the
original plaintiffs in Travis v. Reno' 4 argued in the Seventh Circuit that the
94. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
95. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
97. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
98. Condon, 155 F.3d at 464.
99. See id. at 464-65 (citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986) (noting that
individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in matters related to their
automobiles)).
100. See id. at 465 (citing Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that an individual must have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality to have a
constitutional right to privacy)).
101. Id. (quoting United States Dept. of Health and Human Services v. FLRA, 833 F.2d
1129, 1135 n.8 (4th Cir. 1987)).
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
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penalty provisions of the DPPA violated the Eleventh Amendment.'05 The
Eleventh Amendment reads: "The []udicial power of the United State shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by [c]itizens of another [s]tate,
or by [c]itizens or [s]ubjects of any [f]oreign [s]tate."''1 6 This amendment
basically bars federal suits by private parties looking to impose liability
with damages coming from the state treasury or public funds, but does not
prevent suits imposing individual and personal liability on state officials. 0 7
The legal debate surrounding these tenets of the amendment centered on
two relevant provisions within the DPPA. The first provision, section
2723(b), provides for a five thousand dollars-a-day civil penalty against the
states for noncompliance with the DPPA.' ° The second provision in
question involved section 2724(a), which allows a civil damages remedy
against a person who knowingly discloses personal information from a
motor vehicle record.1'9 The plaintiffs feared that these punitive provisions
would authorize suits against public/state employees, in their official
capacities, and agents."0 This would directly violate the Supreme Court
ruling that, absent a waiver, Congress is prohibited from authorizing suits
against states because "the Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the
power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity.""'
Although the Eleventh Circuit never reached the Eleventh
Amendment issue,' in the initial Pryor case, the Alabama District Court
reasoned that the DPPA did not authorize private individuals to initiate
actions against a state since, under section 2725(2), "person" means "'an
individual, organization, or entity, but.., not a State or agency.""' 3 In
addition, the court refused to go beyond interpreting the plain meaning of
the statute despite the fact that only state employees have access to and the
ability to release the records." 4 Alabama also argued that the Eleventh
Amendment precluded the United States from taking action against the
states, thus rendering unconstitutional the imposition of civil penalties
105. See id. at 1006.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
107. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1331-32 (M.D. Ala. 1998); rev'd, 171 F.3d
1281 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. July 6, 1999) (No. 99-61)
(citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991)).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b) (1994).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) (1994).
110. See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1007; see also Pryor, 998 F. Supp. at 1331.
111. Pryor, 998 F. Supp. at 1331 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996)).
112. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1288 n.10 (llth Cir. 1999).
113. Pryor, 998 F. Supp. at 1332 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2725(2) (1994)).
114. See id.
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against the states for noncompliance under section 2723(b). The court,
however, insisted that this argument was "patently frivolous" and that the
Supreme Court refused to bar federal court suits by the federal government
against a state under the Eleventh Amendment." 5 But other than directly
citing one case, the court gave no additional reasons for its rationale, only
stating "[t]he court takes very seriously its oath and obligation to uphold
the supreme law of the land and would neither be presumptuous enough





Similarly, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the statute "seems" to
limit suits to personal capacity actions, which, in theory, should avoid
subsequent constitutional problems. The court added that a future suit
brought directly under section 2724 exposing a state to financial liability
would allow for more time to determine if the Constitution authorized that
step." 7 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit determined that for the purposes of
the case at bar, the DPPA did not violate the Eleventh Amendment and
moved on to examine the Acts' constitutionality under a fourth and final
constitutional amendment: the First Amendment.
D. First Amendment
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits were the only courts to recognize
possible First Amendment challenges to the DPPA, and they actively
avoided extensive discussions or legal rationales. For example, in Condon,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that although the several media intervenors'
in the case had challenged the DPPA's constitutionality on First
Amendment grounds, the district court had found the Act unconstitutional
under the Tenth Amendment and, therefore, had not been required to and
chose not to discuss the First Amendment issue." 9 As a consequence, the
115. See id. at 1333.
116. Id.
117. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit went
on to state that addressing the Eleventh Amendment in a later case would also most likely
raise the issue they had "ducked" all along, specifically "whether [section five] of the
[F]ourteenth [Almendment supports the Act and therefore authorizes Congress to override
the [E]leventh Amendment." Id.
118. The media intervenors in the Condon case included the South Carolina Press
Association, Virginia Press Association, North Carolina Press Association, West Virginia
Press Association, Maryland/Delaware Press Association, the Newspaper Association of
America, and the American Society of Newspaper Editors. See Driver's Privacy Protection
Act of 1994 Ruled Unconstitutional (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.fac.org/
news/970912a-s.asp>.
119. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 455 n.1 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Reno v.
Condon, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
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district court's choice precluded the court of appeals from addressing the
First Amendment challenge as well.
The Seventh Circuit in Travis examined the merits of a potential First
Amendment challenge, but never reached a decision on the issue. Relying
on Supreme Court precedent that some access rights connected to the
judicial process are protected by the First Amendment, 12 the court
conceded that it could not exclude the possibility that in the future, a
particular driver's license record could be deemed constitutionally exempt
from the Act. However, the Seventh Circuit characterized the case at bar
as a "facial attack" on the DPPA and reasoned that this case was simply
"not the time or place to explore the [record access] subject."'22 The court
concluded its short First Amendment discussion by commenting that if the
plaintiffs had truly wanted to assert a constitutional claim on the right of
access to a particular record, they should have sued the record's custodian,
who had the power to disclose the record, instead of the Attorney General
or the United States.1
V. RAMIFICATIONS
A. First Amendment Implications
Although all the courts thoroughly examined the DPPA under the
concept of dual sovereignty, none of them properly addressed the First
Amendment concerns that the DPPA raises. In fact, even though two of the
four federal appellate courts deemed the DPPA constitutional, neither of
their analyses included a comprehensive review of the Act's effects on
information access or the First Amendment. Not only does this omission
leave open a wide window for further debate, but it calls into question the
stability of the courts' conclusions that have already been reached with
regard to the Act's constitutionality.
The First Amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' 24 While the
First Amendment's Speech and Press Clauses have been interpreted in
many contexts, the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
120. See Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that
absent overriding interests, trials of criminal cases must be open to the public).
121. See Travis, 163 F.3d at 1007.
122. Id.
123. See id. The Tenth Circuit emphasized that the proper defendant to sue is the person
whose actions cause injury, not the author of the legal rule that leads to those actions. See id;
Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1998); Quinones v. Evanston, 58 F.3d 275,
277 (7th Cir. 1995).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Virginia125 stated that they clearly conferred the right to gather information
and, subsequently, protected the public's right to know in regards to trials
involving criminal cases. 126 In its decision, the Richmond Court reiterated
the Court's previous findings that the First Amendment should be
interpreted as broadly as possible. ' 27 As the Court had stated earlier in
Branzburg v. Hayes,'28 "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 29 While this protection at times
has been limited by the Court-for example, with prisons30 and
nonjudicial p-e information shielded by the DPPA should
not fall subject to such limitation because, as discussed below, the records
involved traditionally have been available and contain information that
often has already been published elsewhere. In addition, the records do not
involve any physical intrusion into privacy, nor do they involve any
sensitive, private information. Finally and most importantly, drivers'
records serve a crucial and fundamental role within the news-gathering
process and the public's right to know.
For example, the Tenth Circuit, in Gilbert v. Medical EconomicsCo132
Co., held that publishing a physician's photograph, name, and private
facts about her psychiatric history and marital life was substantially
relevant to the newsworthy topic of policing failures in the medical
profession and did not constitute an invasion of privacy. 3 The court
reasoned that if a matter involves a "legitimate public interest" that is of
"newsworthy" value, the disclosure or publication of information about
that matter is said to be protected or "privileged" under the First
Amendment. '34
The right of seeking out the news for a legitimate public interest falls
125. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
126. See id. at 576-77.
127. See id. at 576 ("For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally .... It must
be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a
liberty-loving society, will allow.").
128. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
129. Id. at 681; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 576.
130. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978). These cases
basically held that no First Amendment right of entry exists for jails or prisons, and that
journalists "have no more right to visit jails or prisons than anyone else does." RALPH L.
HOLSINGER & JON PAUL DILTS, MEDIA LAW 369 (3d ed. 1994).
131. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that protective
orders were proper to prevent a newspaper from publishing information its lawyers had
collected while attempting to defend against a libel suit).
132. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
133. See id. at 308-09.
134. Id.
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into great contention with the DPPA. Motor vehicle records are used for
many reasons in the news-gathering process and usually result in benefiting
public safety. In a letter of opposition sent to Senator Hatch and the U.S.
Senate's Committee on the Judiciary, the Utah branch of the Society of
Professional Journalists cited several important situations in which motor
vehicle records have been recently used in furtherance of the public
interest. '35 For example, the group wrote that news organizations
discovered that there were pilots, bus drivers, and police officers who had
driving under the influence (DUI) convictions and were still operating
vehicles. 116 A series of articles in New Mexico based on these records
"helped change the state's DUI laws and the court system's leniency with
DUI convictions.' 37 Similarly, a Florida reporter used the records to
identify drivers who had six or more DUI convictions and were still behind
the wheel.' Still another reporter utilized the records to pick out hooded
members of the Ku Klux Klan who had marched through the area.,M
Hundreds of stories like these are found through the use of motor vehicle
records-"basic record[s] used daily by journalists to track down sources
and report on public safety issues," 14-yet thousands of similar stories
undoubtedly have been squelched by the 1997 implementation of the
DPPA.
In addition to these functional problems, media organizations claim
the DPPA has inconsistent practical ramifications. Motor vehicle records
often allow verification of the names of car owners or drivers to prevent
incorrect identification in news stories of individuals with common141
names. In some states, the state statutes already prohibited this use. Even
in states where the media still can utilize records for name verification
purposes, press associations continue to fear that this concern will become
a reality in just a matter of time.
Despite the strength and validity of the above arguments, it is
impossible to thoroughly determine the constitutionality of the DPPA
without evaluating First Amendment rights in light of the notion of right to
135. See 139 CONG. REc. S15,763 (1993) (letter from the Society of Professional
Journalists, Utah Headliners Chapter).
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See Watkins, supra note 11, at 985.
139. See id. (citing Congress Should Steer Clear of State Drivers' Records, THE NEWS
MEDIA & THE LAW
140. Schumacher, supra note 1, at 23.
141. See Kyle E. Niederpruem, FOI Alert, Volume 2, Issue 13, Indiana Slams Records
Shut in Surprise Move (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http:llspj.org/foia/alerts/alertsv21
issue.13.htm>.
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privacy. Although many proponents of the DPPA argue that Congress
created the Act in line with the public's "right to privacy" under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Circuit reiterated in Condon
that there never has been a distinct constitutional right to privacy. 42 In fact,
in 1977, the Supreme Court clearly stated in Whalen v. Roe 43 that "there is
no 'general constitutional right to privacy."" 44 The Court later, however,
went on to extend a constitutional "zone of privacy" to two separate
interests: (1) "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions," and (2) "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters. 145
The Whalen Court's creation of the first interest-independent
decision making-set up the Court to find in 1978 the existence of a
limited right to privacy in marriage in Zablocki v. Redhail. 46 This "limited
right," first established by the Court in the context of reproduction in the
1942 case Skinner v. Oklahoma,147 slowly extended to the issue of
contraception in the 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut,14 and then to
abortion in the 1973 controversy, Roe v. Wade. 49 These privacy rights,
however, have always been clearly limited rights, as "there is no explicit
constitutional guarantee of a right to privacy."' 50 This first interest in no
way implicates the information included in drivers' records and covered by
the DPPA. Although the Whalen Court also created the second interest of
nondisclosure, it seemingly did not view the interest as "fundamental,"
because it did not apply strict scrutiny in evaluating this interest in the
Whalen case itself. Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court has never
decided a case where it invalidated a government regulation or action
142. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, Reno v. Condon,
119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
143. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
144. Id. at 607-08 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
350-01 (1967)).
145. Id. at 599-600; see also FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 62-63
(1997).
146. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
147. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
148. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
149. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
150. CATE, supra note 145, at 65. Cate concludes that the Supreme Court has established
four primary areas of privacy rights: "First Amendment protection for expression,
association, and religion; Fourth Amendment limits on searches and seizures; fundamental
decisionmaking [sic] grounded in 'penumbras' and 'emanations' of the Bill of Rights; and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process and protection for nondisclosure of
personal information (also based on the Fourteenth Amendment)." Id.
151. See id. at 63.
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under this second privacy interest. 152
However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that privacy
rights-no matter what they are-actually have no real impact on the
DPPA's constitutionality, because the Act at no time reaches far enough to
implicate these privacy interests. For example, Judge Williams pointed out
in Condon v. Reno153 that the Supreme Court has recognized that
automobiles do not come with privacy guarantees.' 4 The Court emphasized
this in New York v. Class'55 in 1986, when it noted that individuals have a
lower privacy expectation in matters regarding their automobiles.1 In
addition, some of the exact information currently protected by the DPPA
has not even been rendered "private information" by some courts. For
example, in 1987, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Bales157 that
disclosing an individual's social security number on a loan application did
not violate the individual's right to privacy.
Notwithstanding the privacy arguments, other logical arguments also
support abolishing the federal DPPA. First, as the Fourth Circuit noted, the
same information restricted under the DPPA is easily available
elsewhere.'59 For example, every licensed pilot's name, address, and
medical data can all be found online in a public database operated by the
United States.'O Similarly, anyone can obtain the name and address of
161
airplane owners by listing the number displayed on the airplane's tail.
Second, private parties often obtain such information for reasons such
as cashing a check, using a credit card, or purchasing alcohol, not to
mention that there has been quite an extensive history of treating motorS162
vehicle records as public records.2 For example, in Department of Health
and Human Services v. FLRA, 163 the Fourth Circuit recognized that an
individual's name and home address "is a matter of public record in motor
vehicle registration and licensing records."'164 Therefore, the DPPA could
152. See id. Although the Supreme Court has not decided such a case, several federal
appellate and district courts have used this interest to do so. See id.
153. 155 F.3d 453 (4thCir. 1998).
154. See id. at 465.
155. 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
156. See id. at 112-13.
157. 813 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987).
158. See id.
159. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 465.
160. See id. at 465 n.9 (citing <http:llwww.avweb.conldatabase/airmen>).
161. See id. (citing <http:llwww.avweb.comldatabase/aircraft>).
162. See id.
163. 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1987).
164. Id. at 1135 n.8; see also Condon, 155 F.3d at 465.
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even be characterized as virtually unnecessary, at least at the federal level.
Along this same vein, additional arguments assert that, although the
DPPA was instituted in part to protect individuals from stalkers, the law
actually does not provide protection from the "disingenuous acquisition of
information" by potential criminals. 16 This refers to the sad fact that a
stalker could feasibly obtain personal information about a victim under a
"guise of legitimacy."' 166 Therefore, "given the persistence and devious
nature of stalkers and the numerous exceptions to confidentiality," the
DPPA ends up providing, at most, only a temporary protection from
stalkers. 67 Ironically, even under the provisions of the federal DPPA,
Rebecca Shaeffer's address most likely would have been located, because
her stalker obtained her information via a private detective who, under the
current Act, falls under one of the fourteen exemptions and can access the
• • • 168
restricted personal information.
Recent trends to curtail news-gathering activities in other ways only
heighten the threat the media received from the federal DPPA. Laws such
as "paparazzi legislation" introduced into the U.S. House of
Representatives by the late Representative Sonny Bono (R-California), in
addition to the independent state legislation on this issue in states such as
California and Michigan, serve as examples of how the media's right to
gather news slowly has been diminished. 69 Erosion of this news-gathering
right occurs mostly because "there's not always a collision between
information and privacy, but there's sufficient conflict to frighten the
public."170 These kinds of unfounded fears most likely also explain the fact
that although sixty-two percent of adults polled by the Associated Press
indicated they felt that motor vehicle and other similar records should stand
165. George B. Stevenson, Federal Antiviolence and Abuse Legislation: Toward
Elimination of Disparate Justice for Women and Children, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 847,
874 (1997); see also Kyle Niederpruem, DMV Data Could Be Lost Without Lobbying
(visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.asne.org/kiosk/editor/june/niederpr.htm>.
166. Stevenson, supra note 165, at 874.
167. Id.
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8) (Supp. III 1997) (allowing disclosure of information
"[f]or use by any licensed private investigative agency or licensed security service for any
purpose permitted under this subsection"); see also Harry Hammitt, States to Feds: We
Don't Want Your Legislated Privacy (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://govt-
tech.govtech.net:80/ gtmagl1997/gtldec/access/access.shtm>. In fact, it has even been said
that, "[a] sixth-grader with a PC is more of an enemy in Senator Boxer's 'war' for privacy
than individuals perusing motor vehicle records." Watkins, supra note 11, at 985 (footnote
omitted).
169. See FOI: Paparazzi Laws, QuiLL, Sept. 1998, at 19 (1998).
170. Kenneth A. Paulson, Commentary: Press Must Encourage Open Records, Not Feed
Public's Privacy Fears (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum.org/newsstand/
forumnews/1997/12s.asp>.
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open to the public in some form or another, only thirty-four percent of
those same adults polled felt that the government should provide access to
a news reporter wanting to expose wrongdoing through use of the
records.
171
As society scrambles toward privacy and fees for information
received through systems providing enhanced access rise, additional
ramifications rear their ugly heads. For example, these record fees often
cost more than obtaining the information directly. 72 This especially holds
true in the advent of privatization, where government agencies delegate
public functions to private contractors.
73
Finally, although the DPPA is completely separate and inherently
different from the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) '7 passed in
1966, both acts share a reliance on state implementation and create huge
repercussions within the news-gathering industry. Despite the fact that
FOIA contains only two exemptions that allow agencies to withhold
175information if disclosure could invade the privacy of individuals, the
Supreme Court, when forced to chose, has elected privacy over openness
171. See Results from the Associated Press Survey, QUILL, Sept. 1997, at 18. The survey
consists of a telephone poll of 1,008 adults taken in all states except Alaska and Hawaii.
172. See Kyle E. Niederpruem, FOIAlert, Vol. 2, Issue 12, Public v. Privatized Records,
Who's Winning This War? (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http:llspj.org/foia/alerts/alertsv21
issuel 1.htm>. "The National Newspaper Association and American Court & Commercial
Newspapers are currently conducting a joint research project examining public-private data
partnerships. Concerns over user fees split between government and private access providers
is driving the debate." Id.
173. See id.
174. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (exempts from disclosure "personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy"); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). This section restricts disclosing:
[R]ecords or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A)
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source, including a [s]tate, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private
institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of
a record or information complied by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source,
(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life
or physical safety of any individual.
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on numerous occasions. 176 This analogy definitely bodes troublesome, as it
demonstrates how the presumption of disclosure intended for FOIA has
been subordinated in the face of privacy interests.177 If this is the case with
a presumption of disclosure, it can only be imagined how far the
presumption of privacy, as embodied by the DPPA, eventually may reach.
B. Costs and Alternatives
The DPPA not only violates several constitutional amendments, but
totes a hefty and unnecessary price tag for states and companies alike.
Instituting the DPPA required the states to absorb excessive income losses
coupled with outrageous expenditures in order to develop mechanisms to
implement and enforce the Act. 78 Even with opt-out provisions in place to
prevent greater losses of income, the monetary costs still appear incredibly
high, especially since no federal funds are available to help the states ease
the price of instituting the Act.179 In fact, in 1997, states' per-year estimates
for implementing the DPPA with opt-out policy procedures ranged from
$120 thousand in Minnesota to one million dollars in Indiana."8° These
figures reflect the cost of notifying not only every driver, but also every
vehicle owner about the availability of the opt-out option. I"' Because of
these projected cost estimates, both the New Mexico and Indiana motor
vehicle departments chose not to implement opt-out provisions for the
federal DPPA. 11 Although this opt-out provision provides only one
176. See The Privacy Paradox: Government Access (visited Aug. 26, 1999)
<http://www.rcfp.org/pp-pt2.html>; see also Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (holding that a third-party must show intent to
use information to examine workings of the government in order to examine individuals'
personally identifiable information from government records); Department of State v. Ray,
502 U.S. 164 (1991) (holding that the State Department could refuse to disclose records
identifying refugees who were denied asylum and consequently deported back to Haiti);
Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487 (1994) (holding that home addresses of
government employees should not be disclosed to union organizers). For an evaluation of
the FOIA, see Jane Kirtley, Freedom of Information Act-How Is it Working? CoMM. LAW.,
Fall 1996, at 7.
177. For a fairly comprehensive listing of Supreme Court decisions involving FOIA, see
Supreme Court Decisions Involving the FOIA (visited Aug. 26, 1999)
<http://www.accessreports.com/statutes/commentary/COURTS.htm>.
178. See Schumacher, supra note 1, at 25.
179. See News Media Update, Another Federal Judge Finds Driver's Records Act
Unconstitutional (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.rcfp.orglNMU/980629f.html>.
180. See Schumacher, supra note 1, at 24-25. As of September 1997, only 432,774
drivers out of 3.5 million in Minnesota utilized the opt-out policy. See id. In addition, the
Arkansas Office of Motor Vehicles also estimated that providing an opt-out provision would
cost $332,000 the first year and $45,000 every year thereafter. See id.
181. See Niederpruem, supra note 43.
182. See Where the States Stand, supra note 38, at 25.
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possibility for circumventing the DPPA's effects, it may be the most
palatable option when compared to the other alternatives, which include
creating media exemptions, stockpiling records, turning to marketing
departments, or blatantly ignoring the law.
The media exemption option garnered much attention in the initial
DPPA implementation debate in 1997, as lines were quickly and sharply
drawn between state press associations and national media groups.13
Created by either law or administrative rule making, media exemptions
allow journalists to continue to check personal information by use of DMV
records.184 However, the records are only opened for matters that involve
vehicle and/or driver safety. Many state press associations supported this
special privilege of guaranteeing access through the media exemptions, but
they often did so fearing that if given the option in an opt-out policy, too
many drivers would opt-out in favor of confidentiality, rendering the
186remainder of the records virtually meaningless. The national
organizations, however, took a different stance on the topic of media
exemptions. Influential groups such as the Society of Professional
Journalists, the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Newspaper
Association of America, the National Newspaper Association, the Radio-
Television News Directors Association, and the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press all argued against media exemptions for the states,
holding fast and true to their long-standing traditions of opposing special
treatment for the news media. 187 In addition, many journalists voiced the
concern that limiting access only to issues involving vehicle and/or driver
safety concerns would prove too narrow a classification and would impede
the routine use of DMV records for reasons such as checking addresses or
name spellings. 88 Despite the controversy, nine states adopted media
exemption laws or policies in the face of the DPPA enactment in 1997.'89
For the nineteen states that did not preserve the access to driver and
vehicle records through either the opt-out or media exemptions, there stand
few viable access options for the media to pursue.' 9 Despite the fact that






189. See Where the States Stand, supra note 38, at 24.
190. See id. The states that chose not to adopt or implement any opt-out provision, media
exemptions, or already had state laws more restrictive than the federal DPPA include the
following: Alabama, Alaska (driver), Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
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many journalists and news agencies may have stockpiled DMV records,
this measure at best buys time. Not only do the records have a limited shelf
life, but stockpiling itself can become a computer nightmare.'9 ' As a result,
some reporters have turned to their media's marketing departments to
retrieve limited information. 92 However, marketing database information
falls subject to the same problems as stockpiled records, and only
statistical-not personal-information is available through these
databases.' 93 The problems encountered are not singular to news agencies'
marketing databases. Rather, they take a toll on many commercial
marketing and database companies that package and sell data.'94 In fact,
companies such as the Polk Companies, TRW Target Marketing Services,
Metromail, and Donnelley Marketing Inc. all lobbied for opt-out laws prior
to the enactment of the federal DPPA.' 95 These marketing companies share
their concerns about profits with many states that gain income from sales
of name and address lists to direct marketers.196
In retaliation to the DPPA, however, some databases which already
possessed personal information gleaned from DMV records claimed they
would just ignore the federal law. One company, Shadowsoft Inc., runs a
World Wide Web site database but requires service users to identify
themselves in order to help prevent criminal usage of the information.' 97
A similar, California-based personal information database, HireRight,
caters to a unique audience that often appears overlooked in discussion of
DPPA ramifications: employers.198 In reality, the DPPA may have its
harshest effects against this group of individuals, as it dramatically limits
access to information that is heavily relied upon in hiring, promotion, and
retention decisions.' 99 Specifically, the DPPA restrictions make it more
difficult for national employers to maintain consistent hiring policies
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See id.; Massachusetts
Registry of Motor Vehicles, supra note 40.
191. See Schumacher, supra note 1, at 24.
192. See id. The News-Press in Fort Myers, Florida, is one newspaper where reporters
successfully utilized the paper's marketing database to gather information about a
neighborhood deed restriction that prohibited residents from parking pickup trucks on the
street or in driveways. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Niederpruem, supra note 43.
196. See John Gibeaut, Keeping Federalism Alive: Courts Overturn Law Barring State
Release of Driver Record, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1998, at 38, 38.
197. See Schumacher, supra note 1 at 24.
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across several states because of the varying state DMV records access
laws. 2 In addition, states are free to enact stricter privacy laws, making it
even more difficult for any employer to obtain the information needed,
especially if the employer is trying to hire drivers.20 1
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Note demonstrates, a great deal of controversy still surrounds
the DPPA as it battles through its second year of implementation. In light
of the recent circuit split, as well as the sheer nature and content of the Act
itself, it is not surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court accepted certiorari
for November 1999. If the Supreme Court rules the DPPA unconstitutional,
the states will then have the option to turn back to their state driver's
202privacy protection statutes enacted prior to the federal DPPA. In at least
thirty-seven states, this means a return to laws far less restrictive than the
federal DPPA, reducing costs to the states, individuals, and employers.
Invalidation of the DPPA would allow individual states to determine how
to best institute systems of privacy protection for drivers while still
maintaining a careful balance with the First Amendment. It also would
secure for journalists across the country the knowledge that driver's
privacy protection acts are not here to halt the news-gathering process or to
inhibit the watchdog function of the media, but rather to protect every
American driver and vehicle owner from misuse and criminal use of
personal information. For "'[a] democratic society ceases to be democratic
when government operates in the dark, and when those in power are




202. See Stephen Key, BMV To Seek Rule Allowing Media Access (visited Aug. 26,
1999) <http://www.hspa.com/bvmseek.htm>. This option, however, creates the risk that "a
bad federal law will remain enshrined in a number of bad state laws." Hammitt, supra note
168.
203. Andrew Glass, A New Threat to FOI: Closing Database Access (visited Aug. 26,
1999) <http:llwww.asne.orglkioskleditor/98.janlglassl.htm> (quoting CoLUMBus (OHIo)
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